The 20th century philosopher A.J. Ayer opposed the metaphysician’s claim that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and our sensory experiences. Ayer’s critique of metaphysics, however, reaches much further than the logic of language, or the separation of philosophy from metaphysics as a branch of knowledge, or the nature of truth; it is also a tool that can be used to combat ideas that have no literal meaning from being deployed in the real world.
Propositions and "Pseudo-Propositions"
Ayer saw an illogical breakdown in the practice of philosophy and the use of language. Metaphysicians assert that one can have knowledge of a transcendent reality, which Ayer finds to be nonsense.
"For I require of an empirical hypothesis, not indeed that it should be conclusively verifiable, but that some possible sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood," Ayer wrote. "If a putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle, then I hold that it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless."
In an attempt to draw a clear line between philosophy and metaphysics, he asserted that only propositions concerning empirical matters of fact, which "can be probable but never certain," constitutes meaningful language.
“For we shall maintain that no statement which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labors of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense,” Ayer wrote.
Ayer distinguishes legitimate propositions—one that is in someway verifiable by our sensory experiences—from “pseudo-propositions,” which, as he put it, “…is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience…” For example, to assert that Freud’s Oedipus complex, which denotes a child’s subconscious sexual desire for the opposite sex parent accompanied by a jealous rage towards the same-sex parent, is either true or false is a pseudo-proposition according to Ayer’s analysis because the truth or falsehood of Freud’s proposition is consistent with all future experiences. Seeing a male child do anything—kick, scream, kiss, hug, etc.—could conceivably be used to support or reject Freud's pseudo-proposition.
Ayer uses his criterion of verifiability, which is supposed to "test whether a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that the sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it," to distinguish between the two types of propositions. There are two types of verifiability concerning legitimate propositions: practical and in principle. Practical verifiability implies that we can know what would constitute conclusive support for it, and could actually verify the proposition if we were inclined to take on the trouble—e.g., “there are 473 different street names in the city of Lodi” fulfills practical verifiability because we know how, and have the means, to verify the claim. Verifiability in principle, which is also the minimum threshold for propositions pertaining to matters of fact, implies that though we know what would constitute verification—i.e., whether it is true or false—we “lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made.” Bertrand Russell coined the “celestial teapot” proposition, which is an example of a proposition that is verifiable in principle, to argue that the burden of proof lies upon the person making the unfalsifiable claim.
A pseudo-proposition does not even meet the criterion of verifiability in principle.
“For it is admitted both by monists, who maintain that reality is one substance, and by pluralists, who maintain that reality is many, that it is impossible to imagine any empirical situation which would be relevant to the solution of their dispute,” Ayer wrote. “But if we are told that no possible observation could give any probability either to the assertion that reality was one substance or the assertion that it was many, then we must conclude that neither assertion is significant.”
Ayer is saying that not only do both monists and pluralists concede no empirical scenario that would sway any favor in the dispute, but also that not any sort of observation would sway favor in any probable way. Commonly said propositions like "morals come from God" or "the soul is infinite" are derided by Ayer as having no literal meaning and being complete nonsense because they fail to express the conditions under which one could verify such assertions. A pious man can very well go on and on about the ultimate destiny of his soul, his personal relationship with the Almighty and how He frequently intervenes in his personal affairs, but such propositions presents the same dilemma in Freud’s Oedipus complex, being that their truth or falsehood are annexed to all possible future sense experiences. Thus it cannot be verified whether the pious man is (if it is true) incredibly fortunate or (if it is false) utterly deranged.
The Perils of a Metaphysical Disclosure
Though Ayer has illustrated how a metaphysical proposition “produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant,” the significance we afford pseudo-propositions has tangible, real-world implications. When conversing about the physical world—politics, public policy, social issues, economics, communications, and of course, philosophy—we often let metaphysical claims influence decisions that have tangible consequences and ramifications.
The most obvious conflict between metaphysics and philosophy exists in religious discourse because it attempts to interweave propositions regarding the sensible and non-sensible world. This state of discourse, which is prevalent today, is what leaves so much of our discourse incoherent and unintelligible—because so much of what we say and write has no literal significance.
A befitting example of how metaphysical claims and pseudo-propositions do not lend themselves to meaningful and productive discourse occurred in a 2007 debate between Jewish Rabbi David Wolpe and neuroscientist Sam Harris, which seemed to expound the inherent problems that plague language when pseudo-propositions that are intended to be significant clash with propositions regarding matters of fact. In the course of justifying religion’s imperative role in society and in an individual’s life, Wolpe stated, “Religion is path to God.” To clarify, Harris replied, “What are you calling God?—Where is God?” Wolpe responded, “God is the intangible creator of the universe, in whose presence a human being can live, and according to whose dictates or will, a human being can live in this world.”
Wolpe added that he did not need any evidence (i.e., verification) for his claim because it was a metaphysical claim—not a scientific claim. This is the luxury that metaphysicians, theologians and the average believer enjoy: the permission to deem non-scientific and metaphysical claims no less significant than propositions about the sensible world while also being exempt from scrutiny. Harris called this mindset regarding metaphysical claims “something that is constrained by our common sense in every other domain of discourse.” The acceptance of pseudo-propositions is a slippery slope, paving the way for all pseudo-propositions to be attributed some significance as a matter of protocol—not according to the content of the proposition in question.
Harris highlighted this slippery slope in his response to this statement by Wolpe: “When I’m looking at you right now, you may assume that what I see is only material, but that is not what I see and that is not what I believe. There is something in you that is more than you believe.” Harris pointed out that people can add any metaphysics they want; but that doing so does not make the proposition meaningful. He cited the fact that there are still people who believe Elvis is alive. This could arguably be a legitimate proposition capable of practical verifiability, for one could travel to Graceland to dig up Elvis’ body. Yet the Elvis conspiracy theorist is completely marginalized in our society by what Harris calls the normal “tests of conversation.” The Elvis conspiracy theorist could still use Wolpe’s argument and say that Elvis is alive in a metaphysical sense. But Harris addressed this logical error with this riposte: “But he could then rattle off about how ‘this is not a scientific claim, it’s a metaphysical claim and a matter of faith, and when I look at you, I see that you might be Elvis [reincarnated].’ He could do this!” The absurdity of metaphysical discourse is unveiled when one carries it to its logical end.
Ayer refrains from over-ambition, conceding that despite having no literal meaning, pseudo-propositions "may still serve to express, or arouse, emotion, and thus be subject to ethical or aesthetic standards." But the space we allow in our discourse for the assertions of both metaphysicians and laymen about God, the soul, and a transcendent reality produces a dilemma so patently antithetical to a society that strives to communicate in a manner that reflects our state of knowledge about the world.
Sources
1. Pojman, Louis. Classics of Philosophy: The Twentieth Century. Volume 3. (Oxford University Press, 2001)
2. Google Videos. "Does God Exist? A debate between Sam Harris and Rabbi David Wolpe."
Michael Boylan - I am 26-years-old, recently graduated from California State University at Fresno, and enjoy writing about culture, society, politics, ...
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